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Abstract
We propose secure RAID, i.e., low-complexity schemes to store information in a distributed manner that is resilient to node
failures and resistant to node eavesdropping. We generalize the concept of systematic encoding to secure RAID and show that
systematic schemes have significant advantages in the efficiencies of encoding, decoding and random access. For the practical
high rate regime, we construct three XOR-based systematic secure RAID schemes with optimal or almost optimal encoding and
decoding complexities, from the EVENODD codes and B codes, which are array codes widely used in the RAID architecture. The
schemes can tolerate up to two node failures and two eavesdropping nodes. For more general parameters we construct systematic
secure RAID schemes from Reed-Solomon codes, and show that they are significantly more efficient than Shamir’s secret sharing
scheme. Our results suggest that building “keyless”, information-theoretic security into the RAID architecture is practical.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the RAID (Redundant Array of Independent Disks) architecture [17], [4], information is stored distributively among
multiple nodes, such as an array of disks or a cluster of networked computers, in a redundant manner that is resilient to
individual node failures. RAID improves the reliability, availability and performance of the system and has seen extensive
applications over the decades [4], [9], [7].
Today, as distributed storage systems are increasingly being used to store critical as well as sensitive data, the challenge of
protecting data confidentiality is imminent [8]. We propose secure RAID, which in addition to being failure-resilient, is also
resistant to eavesdroppers compromising individual nodes. Specifically, we address the problem of storing a message among
n nodes such that any n− r nodes can decode the message but any coalition of z nodes cannot infer any information about
the message. This problem was studied in the literature under the context of secret sharing [1], and rate-optimal schemes (i.e.,
schemes that store a message of maximum size given parameters n, r, z) are known such as Shamir’s scheme [20] and its
ramp version [2]. However, application of secret sharing schemes to distributed storage systems has been limited by their high
complexities [13], [21], [19], [14]. Particularly, existing secret sharing schemes are significantly more intensive in terms of
computation than their erasure code counterparts, such as Reed-Solomon [15] and EVENODD [3] codes, that are extensively
employed in practical storage systems, notably for the RAID architecture.
We study the design of low-complexity schemes, termed secure RAID schemes, that have similar computational complexities
as their erasure code counterparts and as such are suitable for the application of distributed storage. Codes for storage are
typically encoded in a systematic manner, for better efficiency in encoding, decoding and random access (decoding partial
message). In secure RAID, while storing the message in the clear is not allowed due to the secrecy requirement, we generalize
the concept of systematic encoding and propose systematic secure RAID schemes. Refer to Fig. 1 for an example of a systematic
scheme, which can optimally tolerate two node erasures and two eavesdropping nodes
For general parameters n, r and z, we present a systematic, rate-optimal scheme based on Reed-Solomon (RS) codes, and
show that its computational complexity is significantly better than Shamir’s scheme, which is also related to RS codes [16]
but is not systematic. However, RS codes require computation over finite fields which complicates implementation and affects
computational efficiency [3]. Designs of more efficient XOR-based array codes have been extensively researched, e.g., [3],
[24], [5], [10]. Specifically, the codeword of an array code is a t× n array; each node stores a column of the array so erasure
and distance are defined column-wise. Well-known families of MDS array codes suitable for RAID include the EVENODD
[3] and B [24] codes. The generator matrices of these codes are “low-density” (sparse), and hence encoding them requires an
optimal or almost optimal number of XOR operations.
We make several contributions in the design of array-based secure RAID schemes. We study the density of the generator
matrix (defined similarly as the generator matrix of linear codes) of secure RAID schemes and prove a lower bound. The
density characterizes the number of operations required by encoding. We construct three families of secure RAID schemes
based on the B and EVENODD codes. Refer to Fig. 1 for an example. The schemes are XOR-based, rate-optimal, and have low
or lowest density generator matrices. Specifically, the schemes can correct r ≤ 2 node erasures and resist z ≤ 2 eavesdropping
nodes. In these schemes, encoding each bit of a message on average requires slightly more than r+z = 4 XORs and decoding
each bit of a message when no erasure occurs on average requires z = 2 or slightly more XORs. We show that these encoding
and decoding complexities are optimal or almost optimal.
Our results suggest that building “keyless”, information-theoretic security into the RAID architecture is practical. Particularly,
for Reed-Solomon, EVENODD or B coded distributed storage systems, extending them to employ the proposed secure RAID
schemes requires only minor modification to the implementation, with small computational and therefore performance overhead.
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Fig. 1: A secure RAID scheme constructed from the B codes [24]. Symbols are bits and operations are XORs. m1, ...,m6
are message bits and u1, ..., u6 are random key bits. The scheme is able to correct two node erasures and is secure against
two eavesdropping nodes. The scheme is optimal in several senses. It has optimal rate and optimal field size. It follows a
generalized systematic form: all keys are stored uncoded in the first row; all message bits are stored uncoded in the second row,
each padded by an optimal number of two keys necessary to defeat two eavesdropping nodes; and the third row is redundant.
The systematic form implies optimal decoding complexity as the message bits can be decoded by canceling the least amount
of keys. The scheme is also optimal in terms of encoding complexity: every key and message bit is checked by an optimal
number of two parities in the redundant (third) row necessary to correct two erasures. Schemes with similar optimal properties
are constructed in Section VI-A for any length p − 1, where 7 ≤ p ≤ 53 is prime. Two infinite families of almost optimal
schemes, which require only slightly more computation in encoding and decoding, are constructed in Section VI and V-A.
II. SETUP AND DEFINITIONS
We consider the problem of storing a message m in a distributed manner that is reliable against disk failures (i.e., erasures)
and secret against eavesdroppers. Namely, for a storage system consisting of n nodes, the message is encoded into n shares, so
that 1) m can be decoded from any n− r shares, i.e., the erasure of any r shares can be corrected, and 2) any z shares do not
reveal any information about the message, i.e., the shares are statistically independent of m. More formally, let Q be a genric
alphabet and let [n] = {1, ..., n}. For any index set I ⊂ [n] and a vector c = (c1, ..., cn), let cI = (ci)i∈I . An (n, k, r, z)Q
secure RAID scheme is a randomized encoding function F that maps a secret message m ∈ Qk and a uniformly distributed
random vector u ∈ Qv , also referred to as keys, to the codeword c = F (m,u) ∈ Qn, such that:
1) (Reliability) ∀I ⊂ [n], |I| ≥ n−r : H(m|cI) = 0, implying a decoding function DI : Q|I| → Qk such that DI(cI) = m.
2) (Secrecy) ∀I ⊂ [n], |I| ≤ z : I(m; cI) = 0.
Such schemes are referred to as the threshold ramp secret sharing schemes [2] in the literature. In this paper we focus on
designing low-complexity schemes suitable for distributed storage, notably for the RAID architectures, and name them secure
RAID schemes. We focus on linear schemes, and following the notation of error-correcting codes for distributed storage [3],
we study two kinds of linear schemes, namely scalar schemes and array schemes. For a scalar secure RAID scheme, Q is a
finite field Fq and the encoding function F is linear over Fq . For an array secure RAID scheme, Q is a vector space Ftq and
m, u are regarded by the encoding function as vectors over Fq of length tk and tv, simply by interpreting each symbol of Ftq
as a block of length t over Fq . When we make this interpretation, m and u are denoted by m¯ and u¯ to avoid confusion. The
encoding function F is linear over Fq , taking m¯ and u¯ as inputs. The output codeword is viewed as a t×n array with entries
ci,j over Fq , i = 1, ..., t, j = 1, ..., n. Note that a column of the array corresponds to an entry of c over Ftq , and that under
the array representation erasure and eavesdropping are column-wise. Alternatively, the output codeword is denoted by c¯ when
regarded as a vector over Fq of length tn, i.e., c¯ = (c1,1, ..., ct,1, ..., c1,n, ..., ct,n). Clearly scalar schemes are special cases of
array schemes with t = 1. Without loss of generality, in the remaining part of the paper it is assumed that the secure RAID
schemes are array schemes. An [n, k]Ftq array code C of minimum distance dmin(C) = r + 1, where the Hamming distance is
defined with respect to Ftq , is equivalent to an (n, k, r, 0)Ftq secure RAID scheme. Denote the dual code of C by C⊥.
In reminiscent of linear codes, we define the generator matrix of a linear secure RAID scheme to be a (v+ k)t×nt matrix
G over Fq such that (u¯, m¯)G = c¯. We refer to the first vt rows of G as the key rows which correspond to the keys, and refer
to the remaining kt rows as the message rows which correspond to the messages. It is useful to note that while two generator
matrices with the same row space generates the same linear code, this is not true for secure RAID schemes. Particularly, let
G be the generator matrix of a secure RAID scheme, performing elementary row operations on G in general will violate the
secrecy condition. And as such the resulting matrix, though has the same row space as G, may not correspond to a valid
scheme.
The rate of an (n, k, r, z) secure RAID scheme is k/n and characterizes the space efficiency of the scheme. The optimal rate
is known to be n−r−zn , namely, the maximum message size is achieved when k = n−r−z [11]. Constructions of rate-optimal
schemes are well known, such as Shamir’s (ramp) secret sharing scheme [20].
An secure RAID scheme is associated with an encoding algorithm and multiple decoding algorithms. The encoding algorithm
is the algorithm of evaluating the encoding function F , and the decoding algorithms are the algorithms of evaluating the decoding
functions DI for |I| ≥ n−r, referred to as the systematic decoding algorithm when |I| = n and the erasure decoding algorithm
when |I| < n. For a secure RAID scheme to be computationally efficient, 1) the encoding/decoding algorithms should take a
small number of operations to encode/decode per message symbol, and 2) the field size q should be small. The computational
efficiency of secure RAID schemes is of immense practical importance as it is closely related to the read and write performances
of the storage systems. In this paper we also address the efficiency of secure RAID schemes in terms of random access, i.e.,
the operation of decoding partial message. Specifically, we study the computational and communication efficiency of decoding
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III. “LOWEST DENSITY” BOUNDS
Define the density of a vector or a matrix to be the number of non-zero entries in the vector/matrix. Designing secure
RAID schemes with low density generator matrices is important because such scheme requires a small number of operations in
encoding. In this section we study lower bounds on the density of the generator matrices of secure RAID schemes. A related
question of practical importance is to determine the amount of independent randomness, i.e., the number of keys, required by
a scheme. We first address this question. The following lemma is useful.
Lemma 1. For any rate-optimal (n, k, r, z)Ftq secure RAID scheme, and any J ⊂ [n] such that |J | = z, it follows that
H(cJ) = zt.
Proof. Let the message m be uniformly distributed and suppose for the sake of contradiction that there exists J ⊂ [n], |J | = z,
such that H(cJ) = zt−  for some  > 0. For the ease of notation, we assume without loss of generality (by permuting the
indexes if necessary) that J = [z]. By the chain rule, H(cJ) =
∑z
i=1H(ci|c[i−1]) = zt − , and it follows that there exists
i′ ∈ [z] such that H(ci′ |c[i′−1]) ≤ t − ′ for some ′ > 0. Hence H(ci′ |c[z]\{i′}) ≤ t − ′. Without loss of generality (by
permuting the indexes if necessary) let us assume that i′ = 1. Denote [i, j] = {i, i+ 1, ..., j}, it follows that
I(m; c[2,z+1])
(a)
= I(m; c[z+1])− I(m; c1|c[2,z+1])
(b)
= I(m; c[z+k])− I(m; c[z+2,z+k]|c[z+1])− I(m; c1|c[2,z+1])
(c)
= kt− I(m; c[z+2,z+k]|c[z+1])− I(m; c1|c[2,z+1])
≥ kt−H(c[z+2,z+k])− I(m; c1|c[2,z+1])
≥ kt− (k − 1)t− I(m; c1|c[2,z+1])
= t−H(c1|c[2,z+1]) +H(c1|c[2,z+1],m)
≥ t−H(c1|c[2,z+1])
≥ t−H(c1|c[2,z])
(d)
≥ ′, (1)
where (a) and (b) follow from the chain rule; (c) follows from the fact that the scheme is rate-optimal and so m can be
decoded from c[z+k], as z + k = n − r; and (d) follows from the hypothesis H(c1|c[2,z]) ≤ t − ′. But (1) contradicts the
secrecy requirement which implies that I(m; c[2,z+1]) = 0. This completes the proof.
Theorem 1. A linear rate-optimal (n, k, r, z)Ftq secure RAID scheme uses at least zt keys over Fq , and is equivalent to a
scheme that uses exactly zt keys.
Proof. Consider any linear (n, k, r, z)Ftq scheme such that k = n− r− z. Recall that the keys is a length-v vector u over Ftq ,
or equivalently a length-vt vector u¯ over Fq . Let the message m be uniformly distributed. We have
H(u) ≥ I(c[z];u|m)
= H(c[z]|m)−H(c[z]|u,m)
(e)
= H(c[z]|m)
(f)
= H(c[z])
(g)
= zt, (2)
where (e) follows from the fact that c[z] is a function of u and m; (f) follows from the secrecy requirement; and (g) follows
from Lemma 1. Equation (2) implies that v ≥ z because H(u) ≤ vt. This proves that the scheme uses at least zt keys over
Fq . It remains to show that the scheme is equivalent to a scheme that uses exactly zt keys.
Denote the generator matrix of the scheme by G, so G is a (v + k)t× nt matrix with entries from Fq . Denote by G1 the
submatrix formed by the first vt rows (i.e., the key rows) and the first zt columns of G, denote by G2 the submatrix formed by
the last kt rows (i.e., the message rows) and the first zt columns of G, and denote by u¯′ = u¯G1. Then c¯[zt] = u¯G1 +m¯G2 =
u¯′ + m¯G2. Let J be an arbitrary subset of [nt] such that |J | = (z + k)t, [zt] ⊂ J and such that m can be decoded from c¯J .
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H(c¯J |m¯, u¯′) = H(c¯J)− I(c¯J ; m¯, u¯′)
(h)
= H(c¯J)− I(c¯J ; m¯, c¯[zt])
≤ (z + k)t− I(c¯J ; m¯, c¯[zt])
(i)
= (z + k)t− I(c¯J ; m¯)− I(c¯J ; c¯[zt]|m¯)
(j)
= zt− I((c¯J ; c¯[zt]|m¯)
= zt−H(c¯[zt]|m¯) +H(c¯[zt]|m¯, c¯J)
(k)
= zt−H(c¯[zt])
(l)
= 0, (3)
where (h) follows from c¯[zt] = u¯′+m¯G2; (i) follows from the chain rule; (j) follows from H(m¯|c¯J) = 0 and so I(c¯J ; m¯) = kt;
(k) follows from [zt] ⊂ J ; and (l) follows from Lemma 1. For any i ∈ [n], since there is a valid J such that i ∈ J , (3) implies
c¯i is a linear function of m¯ and u¯′. Note that u¯′ is a vector of length-zt with entries i.i.d. uniformly distributed over Fq .
Hence there exists a matrix G′ such that c¯ = (u¯′ m¯)G′, i.e., G′ is the generator matrix of an equivalent scheme that uses
exactly zt keys. This completes the proof.
Theorem 1 shows that for rate-optimal schemes, zt keys are sufficient and necessary. In the remaining part of the paper we
assume that a rate-optimal (n, k, r, z)Ftq secure RAID scheme uses exactly zt keys, and as such the generator matrix G of the
scheme has size (z + k)t× nt. The following theorem lower bounds the density of G.
Theorem 2. Consider the generator matrix of a rate-optimal (n, k, r, z)Ftq secure RAID scheme, then the density of each key
row is at least n− z + 1, and the density of each message row is at least r + 1.
Proof. Denote by G the generator matrix. Let the message m be uniformly distributed. Let J be an arbitrary subset of [n]
such that |J | = k + z, and let Z be an arbitrary subset of J such that |Z| = z, then we have
H(c|cJ) = H(c, cJ)−H(cJ)
= H(c)−H(cJ)
(a)
≤ (z + k)t−H(cJ)
= (z + k)t−H(cJ\Z |cZ)−H(cZ)
(b)
= (z + k)t−H(cJ\Z |cZ)− zt
≤ kt− I(m; cJ\Z |cZ)
= kt−H(m|cZ) +H(m|cJ)
(c)
= kt−H(m|cZ)
(d)
= 0, (4)
where (a) follows from Theorem 1; (b) follows from Lemma 1; (c) follows from the fact that m can be decoded from cJ ;
and (d) follows from the secrecy requirement. Equation (4) implies the erasure of any n− k− z entries of c can be corrected,
and so that the row space of G is a code of minimum distance n− k− z + 1 = r+ 1. Therefore each row of G must have at
least r + 1 non-zero entries.
It remains to lower bound the density of the first zt rows of G. Let Z be an arbitrary subset of [n] such that |Z| = z, we
have
H(u|cZ ,m) = H(u|m)− I(cZ ;u|m)
(e)
= zt− I(cZ ;u|m)
(f)
= zt− I(cZ ;u,m) + I(cZ ;m)
(g)
= zt− I(cZ ;u,m)
(h)
= zt−H(cZ)
(i)
= 0, (5)
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requirement; (h) follows from the fact that cZ is a function of u and m; and (i) follows from Lemma 1. Equation (5) implies
that, if m is fixed to 0, then the erasure of any n−z entries of c can be corrected as one can first recover u and then compute
c. Therefore the row space of the submatrix formed by the first zt rows of G is a code of minimum distance n − z + 1.
Therefore the first zt rows of G each has at least n− z + 1 non-zero entries. This completes the proof.
From Theorem 2 we obtain a lower bound on the encoding complexity of an XOR-based (i.e., q = 2) secure RAID scheme.
Corollary 1. Encoding a rate-optimal (n, k, r, z) secure RAID scheme over Ft2 requires at least r + z + rz−zn−r−z XORs per
message bit.
Proof. By Theorem 2, the density of the key rows is at least n−z+1 and the density of the message rows is at least r+1. By
Theorem 1 there are zt key rows. As the scheme is rate-optimal there are (n−r−z)t message rows. Therefore the density of the
generator matrix is at least zt(n−z+1)+(n−r−z)t(r+1) and encoding it requires at least zt(n−z+1)+(n−r−z)t(r+1)−nt
XORs. Therefore, the number of XORs amortized over the message bits is
zt(n− z + 1) + (n− r − z)t(r + 1)− nt
(n− r − z)t = n+ r +
rz − z
n− r − z (6)
IV. SYSTEMATIC SECURE RAID SCHEMES
Conventional codes for distributed storage are typically encoded in a systematic way. Namely, a codeword contains two sets
of symbols: the uncoded message symbols that appear “in the clear” which are referred to as the systematic symbols, and
the set of redundant symbols. Systematic codes have important advantages in terms of computational efficiency. Specifically,
encoding systematic codes only requires computing redundant symbols. This is important when the rate of the code is high,
i.e., the number of redundant symbols is small compared to the number of systematic symbols, which is the usual case in
storage. Decoding of systematic codes is trivial in the usual case that no systematic symbols are erased. Likewise, random
accessing a subset of message symbols is efficient for systematic codes. For secure RAID schemes, conventional systematic
encoding is forbidden by the secrecy requirement. This motivates us to generalize the concept of systematic encoding under
the context of secrecy.
Definition 1. An (n, k, r, z)Ftq secure RAID scheme is systematic if
(1). The keys u¯ = (u¯1, ..., u¯tv) are stored in the uncoded form in tv entries of the codeword c¯.
(2). The message symbols m¯1, ..., m¯tk are stored in the uncoded form in tk entries of the codeword c¯, each padded by a
linear function of the keys. Namely, in c¯ there is an entry of the form m¯i + fi(u¯), for i = 1, ..., tk.
(3). For i = 1, ..., tk, the padding function fi(u¯) is a function of exactly z keys.
The tv systematic key symbols and the tk systematic message symbols are referred to as the systematic symbols.
Similar to systematic codes, by requiring the systematic symbols to take the simplest possible form, systematic secure RAID
schemes have strong advantages in terms of computational efficiency. Specifically, in Definition 1, (1) ensures that encoding
and decoding (when no erasure has occurred) the systematic key symbols are trivial; (2) ensures that encoding and decoding
(when no erasure has occurred) the systematic message symbols only require computing the padding functions fi’s; and (3)
ensures that the fi’s take the optimal form amenable to computation, in the sense that fi has to be a function of at least z
keys in order to meet the secrecy requirement. Because otherwise if fi is a function of less than z keys, then an adversary
can decode m¯i by looking at no more than z entries of c¯, a contradiction. Systematic schemes also have optimal efficiency
in terms of random access, in the sense that decoding a single entry of m¯ requires communicating and canceling a minimum
number of z keys.
A. Method of Constructing Secure RAID Schemes
We introduce a method to design systematic secure RAID schemes. The method falls under the general framework of coset
coding, which dates back to Wyner’s work [23] on the wiretap channel. However here we put special emphasis on designing
efficient and systematic schemes in the context of secure RAID.
Consider an an [n, k1] code C1 and an [n, k2] code C2, both over alphabet Ftq , such that every codeword of C1 is a codeword
of C2, i.e., C1 is a subcode of C2. Given such a pair of codes C1 and C2, we construct a secure RAID scheme as follows.
Encode C2 systematically and denote the index set of the systematic symbols in the codeword by I2. Encode C1 systematically
such that the index set I1 of its systematic symbols satisfies I1 ⊂ I2 (which is possible as C1 ⊂ C2). Alternatively, we can
encode C1 in more flexible ways as long as there is a set of entries I1 in the codeword such that I1 ⊂ I2 and that C1 can be
decoded from the entries in I1. The secure RAID scheme has 2 steps.
Step 1: Draw tk1 random keys u¯ independently and uniformly from Fq . Encode C1 by regarding the keys u¯ as information
symbols to obtain a codeword, and then puncture (delete) all entries in the codeword that is not in I2. Denote the punctured
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codeword of C1.
Step 2: Let m¯ = (m¯1, ..., m¯t(k2−k1)) be the secret message with entries from Fq , and denote by e = d+(0, m¯), where 0 is
a length-tk1 zero vector corresponding to the entries in I1 and m¯ corresponds to the entries in I2\I1. Encode C2 by regarding
e as information symbols to obtain a codeword c¯. c¯ is a a length-tn vector over Fq , and is the output codeword of the secure
RAID scheme. Note that the codeword c as a length-n vector over the original alphabet Ftq can be obtained by collapsing each
length-t segment in c¯ into one symbol over Ftq .
An illustration of the construction method is shown in Figure 2.
Fig. 2: Construction of SDSS from a pair of erasure codes C1 and C2 when I1 = [tk1] and I2 = [tk2].
Theorem 3. Let C1 be an (n, k1) code and C2 be an (n, k2) code, both over Ftq , such that C1 is a subcode of C2. Then the
described encoding scheme is an (n, k2−k1, r, z) secure RAID scheme over Ftq , where r = dmin(C2)−1 and z = dmin(C⊥1 )−1.
Proof. We need to show that the scheme meets the reliability requirement and the secrecy requirement. Because c is a codeword
of C2, and the minimum distance of C2 is r + 1, it follows that any r erasures of the entries of c can be corrected. Decoding
m from c is simple, as one can read the systematic key entries u¯ from c¯, and then calculate d from u¯, and then cancel d
from the systematic message entries to obtain m¯. This verifies the reliability requirement.
We now prove the security of the scheme. Consider the case that the adversary observes a specific vector cI , where I is the
index set of the entries of c that are tapped by the adversary. We assume without loss of generality that |I| = z. Recall that
F (m,u) is the encoding function of the scheme, it suffices to show that Pr{FI(m,u) = cI |m} is a constant independent
of the choice of m, where the probability is taken over the distribution of the keys. Consider the system of linear equations
defined by FI(m,u) = cI in variables u, where m and cI are fixed, we are interested in finding the number of solutions to
this system.
Let G2 be the tk2 × tn generator matrix of C2 over Fq , such that (u¯, m¯)G2 = c¯. Let G1 be the submatrix formed by the
first tk1 rows of G2. Then G1 is a generator matrix of C1. Denote by I¯ the index set of the entries of c¯ corresponding to the set
of entries indexed by I in c, so |I¯| = tz. We claim that the set of columns of G1 indexed by I¯ must be linearly independent.
To prove the claim, assume for the sake of contradiction that they are linearly dependent and so there exists a length-tn vector
v¯ such that G1v¯T = 0, and such that v¯ is non-zero only in the entries indexed by I¯ . Because G1 is a parity check matrix of
C⊥1 , let v be a length-n vector over Ftq obtained by collapsing each length-t segment in v¯ into a symbol over Ftq , then v is a
codeword of C⊥1 that is non-zero only in the entries indexed by I . Since |I| = z but dmin(C⊥1 ) = z+ 1, this is a contradiction.
Denote the submatrix formed by the last tk2 rows of G2 by G3. For i = 1, 2, 3, denote by Gi,I¯ the submatrix formed by
columns of Gi indexed by I¯ . Then FI(m,u) = cI is equivalent to u¯G1,I¯ = c¯I¯ − m¯G3,I¯ . Since G1,I¯ has full column rank, it
follows that the system of equations u¯G1,I¯ = c¯I¯ − m¯G3,I¯ in variables u¯ always has a solution, and the number of solution
is exactly |Null(G1,I¯)|, where Null(A) is the left null space of matrix A, i.e., {x : xA = 0}. By the rank-nullity theorem,
|Null(G1,I¯)| = qt(k1−z). Because u¯ is uniformly distributed, we have Pr{FI(m,u) = cI |m} = |Null(G1,I¯)|/qtk1 = q−tz ,
which is independent of m¯. This completes the proof.
An [n, k] code C is MDS (maximum distance separable) if dmin(C) = n − k + 1. An important special case of is that C1
and C2 are both MDS codes.
Corollary 2. If C1 and C2 are MDS codes, then the described encoding scheme is an (n, k2 − k1, n − k2, k1) secure RAID
scheme. Particularly, the scheme has optimal rate. Additionally, if the scheme is scalar, then it is systematic.
Proof. We first state a known fact.
Lemma 2. [24], [15] A code C is MDS if and only if C⊥ is MDS.
Note that the lemma is true for both scalar and array codes. Therefore, dmin(C2) = n − k2 + 1 and dmin(C⊥1 ) = k1 + 1.
Hence it follows from Theorem 3 that the scheme is an (n, k2− k1, n− k2, k1) secure RAID scheme. Clearly the scheme has
optimal rate. To see that the scheme is systematic, we only need to verify condition 3 in Definition 1, which is trivially true
when t = 1 because |u¯| = k1 = z.
We remark that the construction method can be interpreted under the framework of coset coding in the following way. Denote
by f the codeword of C1 by encoding u¯, and denote by g the codeword of C2 by encoding (0, m¯). Because C1 is a subcode
7of C2, f is exactly the codeword of C2 by encoding d (which is the punctured f ). Therefore it follows from the linearity of
C2 that c¯ = f + g. Let H1 be the systematic parity check matrix corresponding to the systematic generator matrix of C1 that
we employ in the scheme, then H1fT = 0. And because H1 is a systematic parity check matrix, we have H1gT = m¯T .
Therefore H1c¯T = H1(fT + gT ) = m¯T . In this sense, the above encoding scheme can be understood as follows: to encode
a secret message m¯, the scheme picks a random element from the coset of C1 whose syndrome is m¯.
The construction method results in schemes that are almost systematic, where I1 is the systematic key symbols, and I2\I1
is systematic message symbols. This systematic form connects the computational complexity of the scheme to that of the
codes. Specifically, the encoding complexity of the scheme is essentially the complexity of encoding C1 and C2. A simple
systematic decoding algorithm for the scheme is to compute d by encoding C1 and then cancel it from e to obtain m¯, hence
the complexity is dominated by encoding C1. The erasure decoding algorithm first corrects the erasures by invoking the erasure
correction algorithm of C2, and then invokes the systematic decoding algorithm. So the complexity is essentially the complexity
of (erasure) decoding C2 plus encoding C1. In words, to construct efficient secure RAID schemes, it suffices to find a pair of
MDS codes C1, C2 of appropriate rates such that C1 ⊂ C2, and that C1 can be efficiently encoded, and that C2 can be efficiently
encoded and decoded.
The construction method is also promising in terms of the simplicity of implementation. Specifically, the encoder of the secure
RAID scheme consists of the encoders of C1 and C2. The decoder of the scheme consists of the encoder of C1 (used in systematic
decoding) and the decoder of C2 (used in correcting erasures). Therefore, if C1 and C2 are amenable to implementation then
so are the secure RAID schemes.
B. Secure RAID from Reed-Solomon Codes
A natural choice of C1 and C2 in the construction method described in Section IV-A are the Reed-Solomon codes. In fact,
Shamir’s scheme can be viewed as based on Reed-Solomon codes [16]. However, we show that a systematic scheme based on
Reed-Solomon codes have significant advantage over Shamir’s scheme in terms of computational efficiency.
Definition 2. (Reed-Solomon Codes [18]) For any n > k, and any prime power q > n, let S = {α1, ..., αn} be a set of
distinct non-zero elements of Fq , the [n, k]Fq,S Reed-Solomon code has a generator matrix
G =

1 1 ... 1
α1 α2 ... αn
...
...
αk−11 α
k−1
2 ... α
k−1
n
 (7)
An equivalent systematic generator matrix G∗ can be obtained by performing elementary row operations on G, such that
G∗ contain an identity submatrix of size k. To construct secure RAID schemes based on Reed-Solomon codes, we let C1 and
C2 to be Reed-Solomon codes defined on the same S and such that C1 has a smaller dimension than C2.
Theorem 4. For any integer n, r and z such that n− r− z > 0 , a systematic, rate-optimal (n, n− r− z, r, z) secure RAID
scheme over Fq can be constructed by choosing C1 to be an [n, z]Fq,S Reed-Solomon code and C2 to be an [n, n − r]Fq,S
Reed-Solomon code in the method described in Section IV-A.
Proof. By Defnition 2, the generator matrix of C1 is a submatrix of the generator matrix of C2, and hence C1 is a subcode
of C2. It is well known that the Reed-Solomon codes are MDS [18], and because Reed-Solomon codes are scalar codes, the
assertion follows from Corollary 2.
Consider an (n, n − r − z, r, z) systematic secure RAID scheme based on Reed-Solomon codes. Encoding the scheme is
essentially encoding C1 and C2, which takes O((r + z)(n − r)) operations (multiplications, divisions or additions) over Fq;
systematic decoding the scheme is essentially encoding C1, which takes O(z(n− z − r)); erasure/error decoding the scheme
can be accomplished by first erasure/error decoding C2 using the error-erasure version of the Berlekamp-Massey decoding
algorithm [15], which takes O(rn) operations, followed by systematic decoding.
In comparison, an (n, n− r− z, r, z) Shamir’s (ramp) scheme can be viewed as the non-systematic version of the proposed
scheme. Encoding Shamir’s scheme requires evaluating a polynomial of degree n − r at n points which takes O(n(n − r))
operations; decoding Shamir’s scheme (with or without erasures) requires interpolating the polynomial which takes O((n−r)2)
operations by Lagrange interpolation. The proposed systematic scheme has significantly better computational efficiency than
Shamir’s scheme. Particularly, in the high rate regime that r and z are fixed and n grows, encoding and systematic decoding the
systematic scheme both take O(n) operations, whereas encoding and decoding (with or without erasures) Shamir’s scheme both
takes O(n2) operations. We remark that though (asymptotically) efficient O(n log n) algorithms are known for encoding and
decoding Shamir’s scheme, they have large overhead factors and are not commonly used in practice [12]. Finally the systematic
scheme is also efficient in random access. Decoding one entry of m in the systematic scheme takes O(z) operations and requires
8communicating z + 1 symbols. Shamir’s scheme, however, does not support random read access and all entries of m need to
be decoded together, requiring O((z + k)2) operations and the communication of z + k symbols, where k = n− r − z.
V. ARRAY-BASED SECURE RAID SCHEMES
Reed-Solomon codes require computation over finite fields which complicates implementation and affects computational
efficiency. More efficient XOR-based array codes, e.g., [3], [24], are proposed and widely used in RAID. The generator
matrices of these codes are sparse, and hence encoding requires an optimal or almost optimal number of XOR operations.
In this section we design XOR-based array secure RAID schemes with optimal or almost optimal computational complexity
from the array codes. Particularly, the schemes have low-density generator matrices that achieves or approach the low bound
in Section III.
A key idea in our constructions is to design C2 based on MDS array codes and design C1 based on their dual codes, in the
construction method described in Section IV-A. This is because the array codes and their duals 1) are both MDS, so that the
resulting secure RAID scheme is rate-optimal; 2) have high and low rate, respectively, so that the scheme has high rate; 3) both
have low or lowest density generator matrices, implying optimal or almost optimal encoding complexity, so that the scheme
is efficient. However, array codes and their duals are rarely known to contain each other. Surprisingly, we can often modify
the codes appropriately to meet the subcode condition, while not compromising their complexity and distance. We follow this
idea to construct three families of optimal and almost optimal schemes in the sequel.
A. Secure RAID from EVENODD Codes
In this subsection we construct a family of low-complexity XOR-based secure RAID schemes from the EVENODD codes
[3]. We show that the density of the generator matrix of the scheme approaches the lower bound in Theorem 2, and that the
scheme is almost optimal in terms of encoding complexity and systematic decoding complexity.
Let p be a prime, the EVENODD code is a [p + 2, p] MDS array code over Fp−12 of minimum distance 3 and with a low
density generator matrix [3]. Refer to Fig. 3 for an example of p = 5. We describe our construction idea using this example.
Denote the code in Fig. 3 by C2, which corrects 2 column erasures. To build secrecy into C2, consider its dual C⊥2 , obtained
by switching the roles of information and parity bit, i.e., in Fig. 3 an information bit ci,6 is checked by (parity) entries labeled
by i in the top plot, and ci,7 is checked by entries labeled by i and S in the bottom plot. Since C2 is MDS, so is C⊥2 . C⊥2 is a
[p + 2, 2] code for secrecy against 2 wiretapped nodes, i.e., if we encode two columns of keys as information bits according
to C⊥2 and pad this key array to a message array, then any two columns in the resulting array reveal no information about
the message. Now we have two efficient codes for reliability and secrecy, respectively. The challenge is to combine them into
a single scheme that is both reliable and secure. The straightforward approach for combining the two codes typically fails.
However, as we show in Section IV-A, we can construct an efficient secure RAID scheme if C1 (the code for secrecy) is a
subcode of C2 (the code for reliability). In our example, C⊥2 is not a subcode of C2. However, switch column 1 and 6 in C⊥2
to obtain C1 (encoding described in Fig. 4), then C1 meets the subcode property. Based on C1 and C2 we construct a secure
RAID scheme as follows. Generate two columns of random keys; encode the keys by C1 but skip the last two columns of the
codeword; pad message bits to the 3-rd to 5-th columns of the key array; finally complete the last two columns by encoding
C2. Note that the first 2 columns store only keys, the next 3 columns store uncoded message bits padded by keys, and the last
two columns are redundant. The encoding of keys is shown in Fig. 4. The scheme corrects 2 erasures, and because C1 ⊂ C2,
the encoding of keys in the last 2 columns is consistent with C1 (see Fig. 4), implying secrecy against 2 wiretapped nodes.
Hence we have the (7, 3, 2, 2) secure EVENODD scheme.
The construction technique can be readily generalized to any prime p. For an integer a, denote by 〈a〉 the unique integer
m, 0 ≤ m < p, such that a ≡ m (mod p).
Construction 1. (EVENODD Code [3]) Let p be a prime, and mi,j , i ∈ [p− 1], j ∈ [p] be the message bits. The codewords
of EVENODD forms a (p− 1)× (p+ 2) array, described by the following encoding mapping. The first p columns of the array
are the systematic symbols, i.e., for i ∈ [p − 1], j ∈ [p], ci,j = mi,j . The last two columns are redundant symbols, i.e., for
i ∈ [p− 1], ci,p+1 =
⊕p
l=1mi,l and ci,p+2 = S +
(⊕p
l=1m〈i+1−l〉,l
)
, where S =
⊕p
l=2m〈1−l〉,l, and for the ease of notation
we define m0,j = 0.
Construction 2. (Secure EVENODD) Let p be a prime. For i ∈ [p− 1], j ∈ [p− 2] and l ∈ [2], let mi,j be the message bits,
and let ui,l be the uniformly distributed key bits. The codewords of secure EVENODD forms a (p−1)×(p+2) array, described
by the following encoding mapping. The first two columns of the array are the systematic key symbols, i.e., ci,1 = ui,1 for
i ∈ [p− 1], and denote uΣ,2 =
⊕p−1
l=1 ul,2,
ci,2 =
 ui,1 ⊕ ui+1,2 i = 1, ..., p− 2
ui,1 ⊕ uΣ,2 i = p− 1
9Fig. 3: [7, 5] EVENODD code. Codeword is a 4 × 7 array. The first 5 columns store information bits. Parity bit ci,6 is the
XOR of all entries labeled by i in the top plot. Parity bit ci,7 is the XOR of all entries labeled by i and all entries labeled by
S in the bottom plot.
Fig. 4: Encoding of keys in the (7,3,2,2) secure EVENODD, which is exactly the encoding of C1. i = 1, ..., 4 in the top
(or bottom) array represents that a key bit ui,1 (or ui,2) is added to the corresponding entry in the codeword array; and Σ
represents that
⊕4
i=1 ui,2 is added. Note that the padding pattern is almost optimal, in the sense that most entries are padded
by only two keys and that when more than two keys are padded, Σ only needs to be computed once.
The 3-rd to p-th columns of the array are the systematic message symbols, i.e., for j = 3, ..., p,
ci,j =
 ui,1 ⊕ u〈i+j−1〉,2 ⊕mi,j−2 i+ j 6= p+ 1
ui,1 ⊕ uΣ,2 ⊕mi,j−2 i+ j = p+ 1
The last two columns of the array are redundant symbols, which are computed by encoding the EVENODD code described in
Construction 1, regarding the first p columns of the array as information symbols.
Lemma 3. In Construction 2, ci,p+1 = ui,1⊕ui,2⊕
(⊕p−2
l=1 mi,l
)
, and ci,p+2 = ui,2⊕S′⊕
(⊕p−2
l=1 m〈i−l−1〉,l
)
, for i ∈ [p−1],
where S′ =
⊕p−2
l=1 m〈−l−1〉,l.
Proof. It follows that
ci,p+1
(a)
=
p⊕
l=1
ci,l
(b)
=
(
p⊕
l=1
ui,1
)
+
 p⊕
l=2
i+l 6=p+1
u〈i+l−1〉,2
+(p−1⊕
l=1
ul,2
)
+
(
p⊕
l=3
mi,l−2
)
= ui,1 ⊕
 p⊕
l=2
i+l 6=p+1
u〈i+l−1〉,2
⊕(p−1⊕
l=1
ul,2
)
⊕
(
p⊕
l=3
mi,l−2
)
= ui,1 ⊕ ui,2 ⊕
(
p⊕
l=3
mi,l−2
)
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= ui,1 ⊕ ui,2 ⊕
(
p−2⊕
l=1
mi,l
)
,
where (a) follows from Construction 1 and (b) follows from Construction 2;. We also have that
S
(c)
=
p⊕
l=2
c〈1−l〉,l
(d)
=
(
p⊕
l=2
u〈1−l〉,1
)
⊕
(
p⊕
l=2
p−1⊕
l′=1
ul′,2
)
⊕
(
p⊕
l=3
m〈1−l〉,l−2
)
=
(
p⊕
l=2
u〈1−l〉,1
)
⊕
(
p⊕
l=3
m〈1−l〉,l−2
)
=
(
p−1⊕
l=1
ul,1
)
⊕
(
p⊕
l=3
m〈1−l〉,l−2
)
=
(
p−1⊕
l=1
ul,1
)
⊕
(
p−2⊕
l=1
m〈−l−1〉,l
)
=
(
p−1⊕
l=1
ul,1
)
⊕ S′,
where (c) follows from Construction 1 and (d) follows from Construction 2. Finally, we have
ci,p+2
(e)
= S ⊕
(
p⊕
l=1
c〈i+1−l〉,l
)
(f)
= S ⊕
 p⊕
l=1
i+1−l 6=0
u〈i+1−l〉,1
⊕
 p⊕
l=2
i+1−l 6=0
ui,2
⊕( p⊕
l=3
m〈i+1−l〉,l−2
)
= S ⊕
(
p−1⊕
l=1
ul,1
)
⊕
 p⊕
l=2
i+1−l 6=0
ui,2
⊕( p⊕
l=3
m〈i+1−l〉,l−2
)
= S′ ⊕
 p⊕
l=2
i+1−l 6=0
ui,2
⊕( p⊕
l=3
m〈i+1−l〉,l−2
)
= S′ ⊕ ui,2 ⊕
(
p⊕
l=3
m〈i+1−l〉,l−2
)
= S′ ⊕ ui,2 ⊕
(
p−2⊕
l=1
m〈i−1−l〉,l
)
,
where (e) follows from Construction 1 and (f) follows from Construction 2.
Theorem 5. For any prime p, secure EVENODD is a (p + 2, p − 2, 2, 2) secure RAID scheme over Fp−12 . In particular, the
average density of the key rows of the generator matrix is 3p−12 , and the average density of the message rows is
4p−5
p−1 .
Proof. We interpret the scheme using the method described in Section IV-A and apply Corollary 2 to prove the correctness
of the scheme. It is clear from the construction that we can regard C2 as the EVENODD code, the first two columns of the
array as systematic key symbols, and the 3-rd to p-th columns as systematic message symbols. Note that though the keys are
not stored in the uncoded form, decoding them from the systematic key symbols is trivial. The encoding mapping of C1 is
given by fixing all message bits to be 0 in Construction 2. Specifically, consider encoding C1 by fixing all mij’s to be 0 in
Construction 2, and then switch the first and (p+1)-th column of the obtained array. Denote the resulting code (after permuting
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the columns) by C′1 and the resulting array by C ′ = (c′ij), then by Construction 2 and Lemma 3,
c′i,j =

ui,1 ⊕ u〈i+j−1〉,2 j = 1, ..., p, i+ j 6= p+ 1
ui,1 ⊕
(⊕p−1
l=1 ul,2
)
j = 1, ..., p, i+ j = p+ 1
ui,1 j = p+ 1
ui,2 j = p+ 2,
(8)
where for the ease of notation we define u0,j = 0. We present an algebraic description of the encoding mapping (8). Let
Mp(x) = x
p−1 + xp−2 + ... + 1 be a polynomial of degree p − 1 over F2. In terms of a (p − 1) × (p + 2) array, we regard
each column of the array as a polynomial modulo Mp(x). Namely, let us use the notation c(β) = cp−1βp−2 + ...+ c2β + c1,
i.e., a polynomial with indeterminate β, to denote a polynomial modular Mp(x), then c(β) correspond to the column vector
(c1, ..., cp−1)T . Let c(β)d(β) denote polynomial multiplication modular Mp(x), and note that βc(β) corresponds to the column
vector (cp−1, c1 + cp−1, c2 + cp−1, ..., cp−2 + cp−1)T . Using this polynomial representation, the encoding mapping (8) is
equivalent to{
C ′ = (c′1(β), ..., c
′
p+2(β)) : c
′
j(β) = u1(β) + β
j−1u2(β), j = 1, ..., p, c′p+1(β) = u1(β), c
′
p+2(β) = u2(β)
}
And the generator matrix of C′1 using the polynomial representation is(
1 1 ... 1 1 0
1 β ... βp−1 0 1
)
(9)
It is easy to see that any 2 columns of the above generator matrix is linearly independent and so the code C′⊥1 has minimum
distance 3 and therefore is MDS. By Lemma 2, C′1 is MDS, with minimum distance p+ 1. It is interesting to note that (9) is
a parity check matrix of the EVENODD code and therefore C′⊥1 is exactly C2. Therefore by Corollary 2, Construction 2 is a
(p+ 2, p− 2, 2, 2) secure RAID scheme.
We now analyze the density of the generator matrix of secure EVENODD. Recall that we say a key/message bit is checked
by cij if the entry in the generator matrix corresponding to the key/message bit and cij equals 1. Then by construction, each
of the ui,1’s is checked for p+ 1 times, and each of the ui,2’s is checked for 2(p− 1) times. Each of the mi,j’s, is checked
for 3 times if i+ j 6= p− 1, and is checked for 2 + p− 1 = p+ 1 times if i+ j = p− 1. This completes the proof.
By Theorem 2, a lower bound on the density of the key rows is p + 1 and a lower bound on the density of the message
rows is 3. Therefore the scheme achieves the lower bound within a factor of 3/2 for the key rows and within a factor of 4/3
for the message rows.
Systematic decoding the scheme is straightforward by first decoding the keys from the first two columns and then canceling
them from the 3-rd to p-th columns. In case of erasures/error, the erasure/error decoding algorithm of EVENODD [3] is
invoked, followed by systematic decoding. Encoding secure EVENODD according to Construction 2 takes a total number of
4p2 − 7p + 1 XORs, or on average 4 + 3p−2 + 2p−1 XORs per message bit. Systematic decoding takes a total number of
2p2− 4p+ 1 XORs, or on average 2 + 1p−2 + 1p−1 XORs per message bit. By Corollary 1, encoding each message bit requires
at least 4 + 2p−2 XORs. Moreover, in order to be secure against z = 2 eavesdroppers, each message bit has to be padded by at
least two keys, and different message bits must not be padded by the same pair of keys, so decoding each message bit requires
at least 2 XORs. Therefore secure EVENODD has almost optimal encoding and systematic decoding complexities.
VI. SECURE RAID FROM B CODES
We construct a family of low-complexity XOR-based secure RAID schemes from the B codes [24]. Similar as before, we
show that the density of the generator matrix of the scheme approaches the lower bound in Theorem 2, and that the scheme
is almost optimal in terms of encoding complexity and systematic decoding complexity.
The B codes are equivalent to perfect one-factorization of complete graphs [24]. For any prime p, the perfect one-factorization
of Kp+1, the complete graph of p + 1 vertexes, is known [22], and as such geometrically defines a family of B codes, also
equivalent to the codes in [25]. We present a simplified algebraic description of this family of B codes. The algebraic description
is useful in later constructions.
We start with the dual B codes which are conceptually simpler. For any prime p, let t = p−12 , the dual B code is a [p− 1, 2]
MDS array code over Ft2 of minimum distance p − 2. We refer the readers to Figure 5 for an example of the dual B code
of p = 7 and an informal description of the construction. Let a, b be integers, we denote by 〈ab 〉 by the unique integer m,
0 ≤ m < p, such that a ≡ bm (mod p).
Construction 3. (Dual B Code). Let p be a prime, t = p−12 and let m1, ...,mp−1 be the message bits. The codewords
of the dual B code forms a t × (p − 1) array, described by the following encoding mapping. The first row of the array
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Node 1 Node 2 Node 3 Node 4 Node 5 Node 6
m1 m2 m3 m4 m5 m6
m2 ⊕m6 m4 ⊕m5 m6 ⊕m4 m1 ⊕m3 m3 ⊕m2 m5 ⊕m1
m3 ⊕m5 m6 ⊕m3 m2 ⊕m1 m5 ⊕m6 m1 ⊕m4 m4 ⊕m2
Fig. 5: Dual B code of length 6. All symbols are binary bits and all operations are XORs. The code is MDS and is able
to correct 6 − 2 = 4 node (column) erasures. Note that each message bit is checked by exactly 4 parities, implying optimal
encoding complexity because this is necessary to correct 4 erasures. In general, Dual B codes with similar properties can be
constructed for any length p− 1, where p is prime, in the following simple way: node i stores mi as well as all sums of the
form ma ⊕mb such that 〈a+ b〉 = i.
consists of the systematic symbols, i.e., c1,j = mj , for j = 1, ..., p − 1. The 2-nd to t-th rows are redundant symbols, i.e.,
ci,j = m〈i·j〉 ⊕m〈(1−i)·j〉, for i = 2, ..., t, j = 1, ..., p− 1.
Theorem 6. The dual B codes in Construction 3 are MDS.
Proof. Note that the dual B codes have dimension k = 2 because there are p − 1 message bits and t = p−12 . Therefore it
suffices to prove that all message bits can be decoded from any two nodes. Suppose the two nodes are node u and v. To
simplify presentation, let us assume that there is an extra bit m0 which is fixed to 0. Then by construction, for x = u, v, node
x stores {ma +mb|a+ b = x, 0 ≤ a, b ≤ p− 1}. Let i = u/2 and j = v/2, where the division is over Fp. We now describe a
path, in which vertexes represent the indexes of the message bits, and edges represent the encoded bits stored in either node u
or v, i.e., the edge (a, b) represents ma+mb. The path consists of p vertexes x1, ..., xp and p−1 edges, defined as follows. Let
the first vertex be x1 = i. Let the odd edges (i.e., the 1-st, 3-rd, ..., (p− 2)-th edges) come from node v, i.e., they are elements
of {(a, b)|a+ b = v = 2j}, and let the even edges come from node u, i.e., they are elements of {(a, b)|a+ b = u = 2i}. For
example, x2 = 2j − i, since node v stores mi + m2j−i and stores no other encoded bits involving mi; and x3 = 3i − 2j ,
since node u stores m2j−i +m3i−2j and stores no other encoded bits involving m2j−i. By induction, it is straightforward to
see that {x1, ..., xp} = {i+ 2a(i− j)|a = 0,±1, ...,±p−12 }.
We claim that the path is simple, i.e., |{x1, ..., xp}| = p. Suppose i+2a(i−j) = i+2a′(i−j), then because i 6= j, it follows
that a = a′, proving the claim. Because Fp has exactly p elements, it follows that {x1, ..., xp} = {0, ..., p − 1}. Particularly,
the path contains a vertex labeled by 0, whose neighbors on the path are vertexes u and v. Let us cut the path at the vertex 0,
obtaining two decoding paths, one starts with vertex u, and the other starts with vertex v. Following the decoding paths, all
message bits on the path can be decoded one by one by cancellation, starting with canceling mu and mv which are stored in
the clear. This completes the proof.
In the 2t × (p − 1)t generator matrix of the dual B code, each row has exactly p − 2 1’s. This meets the obvious lower
bound on the number of 1’s (the dual B code has minimum distance p−2), and therefore the dual B code has a lowest density
generator matrix. This matrix is a (systematic) parity check matrix of the B code, from which we can immediately obtain a
generator matrix of the B code, by recalling that [A Irt] is a parity-check matrix of an [n, k = n− r] code C over Ftq if and
only if [Ikt − AT ] is a generator matrix of C. We refer the readers to Figure 6 for an example of the B code of p = 7 and
an informal description of the construction.
Construction 4. (B Code). Let p be a prime, t = p−12 and let mi,j , i ∈ [t−1], j ∈ [p−1] be the message bits. The codewords
of the B code forms a t× (p−1) array, described by the following encoding mapping. The first t−1 rows of the array consists
of the systematic symbols, i.e., ci,j = mi,j , for i ∈ [t − 1], j ∈ [p − 1]. The t-th row consists of the redundant symbols, i.e.,
ct,j =
⊕t−1
k=1
(
mk,〈 jk+1 〉 ⊕mk,〈− jk 〉
)
, for j ∈ [p− 1].
By Lemma 2, the B codes are MDS and can correct 2 node erasures. In the (p− 3)t× (p− 1)t generator matrix of the B
code, each row has exactly three 1’s, meeting the obvious lower bound (the B code has minimum distance 3), and therefore
the B code has a lowest density generator matrix.
We now present the (n = p− 1, k = p− 5, r = 2, z = 2) secure RAID scheme based on the B code.
Construction 5. (Secure B). Let p be a prime and t = p−12 . Let u1, ..., up−1 be the uniformly distributed key bits and let
mi,j , i ∈ [t − 2], j ∈ [p − 1] be the message bits. The codewords of secure B forms a t × (p − 1) array, described by the
following encoding mapping. The first row of the array consists of the systematic key symbols, i.e., c1,j = uj ⊕ u〈2·j〉⊕ u〈−j〉,
j ∈ [p − 1]. The 2-nd to (t − 1)-th rows are the systematic message symbols, i.e., ci,j = u〈(i+1)·j〉 ⊕ u〈−i·j〉 ⊕mi−1,j , for
i ∈ [2, t−1], j ∈ [p−1]. The t-th row consists of the redundant symbols, which are computed by encoding the B code described
in Construction 4, regarding the first (t− 1)-rows of the array as information symbols.
An example of the scheme is shown in Fig. 7. Similar to previous discussion, the construction idea is to let C2 be the
B code and design C1 to take a form similar to the dual B code, because it is low rate, MDS, and has optimal encoding
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Node 1 Node 2 Node 3 Node 4 Node 5 Node 6
m1,1 m1,2 m1,3 m1,4 m1,5 m1,6
m2,1 m2,2 m2,3 m2,4 m2,5 m2,6
m1,4 ⊕m1,6⊕ m1,1 ⊕m1,5⊕ m1,5 ⊕m1,4⊕ m1,2 ⊕m1,3⊕ m1,6 ⊕m1,2⊕ m1,3 ⊕m1,1⊕
m2,5 ⊕m2,3 m2,3 ⊕m2,6 m2,1 ⊕m2,2 m2,6 ⊕m2,5 m2,4 ⊕m2,1 m2,2 ⊕m2,4
Fig. 6: B code of length 6. All symbols are binary bits and all operations are XORs. The code is MDS and is able to correct
2 node (column) erasures. Note that each message bit is checked by exactly 2 parities, implying optimal encoding complexity
because this is necessary to correct 2 erasures. In general, B codes of minimum distance 3 and with similar properties can be
constructed for any length p− 1, where p is prime, in the following way: construct the dual B code of length p− 1 and switch
the role of information bits and parity bits. Specifically, the parity bit of node i in the B code corresponds to the information
bit of node i in the dual B code, i.e., mi; in the dual B code, mi is checked by n−2 parities; these n−2 parities are regarded
as information bits in the B code, where they are exactly the set of information bits check by the parity bit of node i.
complexity. However, the dual B code is not contained in the B code, and we need to design C1 carefully to meet C1 ⊂ C2
without compromising complexity.
Note that the way that the keys are padded to the systematic message symbols is similar to the dual B code. With the
construction method in Section IV-A in mind, the idea here is that we choose C2 to be the B code and design C1 based on the
dual B code. Refer to Figure 7 for an example of secure B. Encoding the scheme is straightforward by Construction 5. Algorithm
1 describes the systematic decoding algorithm when no erasure occurs. The correctness of Algorithm 1 is straightforward. In
the case of no more than r = 2 node erasures, the erasure decoding algorithm of the B code [24] is invoked to correct the
erasures, and then Algorithm 1 is invoked to decode the secret message.
Node 1 Node 2 Node 3 Node 4 Node 5 Node 6
u1 ⊕ u2 ⊕ u6 u2 ⊕ u4 ⊕ u5 u3 ⊕ u6 ⊕ u4 u4 ⊕ u1 ⊕ u3 u5 ⊕ u3 ⊕ u2 u6 ⊕ u5 ⊕ u1
u3 ⊕ u5 ⊕m1 u6 ⊕ u3 ⊕m2 u2 ⊕ u1 ⊕m3 u5 ⊕ u6 ⊕m4 u1 ⊕ u4 ⊕m5 u4 ⊕ u2 ⊕m6
uΣ ⊕ u1⊕ uΣ ⊕ u2⊕ uΣ ⊕ u3⊕ uΣ ⊕ u4⊕ uΣ ⊕ u5⊕ uΣ ⊕ u6⊕
u4 ⊕m3 ⊕m5 u1 ⊕m6 ⊕m3 u5 ⊕m2 ⊕m1 u2 ⊕m5 ⊕m6 u6 ⊕m1 ⊕m4 u3 ⊕m4 ⊕m2
Fig. 7: The (6,2,2,2) secure B scheme. uΣ =
⊕p−1
i=1 ui. The first row stores the (relaxed) systematic key bits, the middle row(s)
stores the systematic message bits, and the last row is redundant. The scheme is optimal in the middle row(s), because each
message bit is padded by exactly two keys necessary for secrecy. Furthermore, the scheme is almost optimal in the last row,
because each parity must involve at least two keys for secrecy and two message bits for reliability. Hence a parity involves
only one more special key uΣ, and takes one more XOR than optimal. The scheme is slightly suboptimal in the first row of
keys. However encoding this row takes 2(p− 1) XORs which is insignificant when amortized over the p2−6p+52 message bits;
and decoding the keys from this row is also efficient, see Algorithm 1.
Lemma 4. In Construction 5, ctj = uΣ ⊕ uj ⊕ u〈j/2〉 ⊕
(⊕t−1
k=2
(
mk−1,〈 jk+1 〉 ⊕mk−1,〈− jk 〉
))
, where uΣ =
⊕p−1
i=1 ui.
Proof. We have
ct,j
(a)
=
t−1⊕
k=1
(
ck,〈 jk+1 〉 ⊕ ck,〈− jk 〉
)
= c1,〈 j2 〉 ⊕ c1,〈−j〉 ⊕
(
t−1⊕
k=2
(
ck,〈 jk+1 〉 ⊕ ck,〈− jk 〉
))
(b)
= u〈j/2〉 ⊕ uj ⊕ u〈−j/2〉 ⊕ u〈−j〉 ⊕ u〈−2j〉 ⊕ uj ⊕
(
t−1⊕
k=2
(
ck,〈 jk+1 〉 ⊕ ck,〈− jk 〉
))
= u〈j/2〉 ⊕ u〈−j/2〉 ⊕ u〈−j〉 ⊕ u〈−2j〉 ⊕
(
t−1⊕
k=2
(
ck,〈 jk+1 〉 ⊕ ck,〈− jk 〉
))
(c)
= u〈j/2〉 ⊕ u〈−j/2〉 ⊕ u〈−j〉 ⊕ u〈−2j〉 ⊕
(
t−1⊕
k=2
(
u〈 (k+1)jk+1 〉
⊕ u〈− kjk+1 〉 ⊕mk−1,〈 jk+1 〉 ⊕ u〈− (k+1)jk 〉 ⊕ u〈 kjk 〉 ⊕mk−1,〈− jk 〉
))
= u〈j/2〉 ⊕ u〈−j/2〉 +⊕u〈−j〉 ⊕ u〈−2j〉 ⊕
(
t−1⊕
k=2
(
u〈− kjk+1 〉 ⊕ u〈− (k+1)jk 〉
))
⊕
(
t−1⊕
k=2
(
mk−1,〈 jk+1 〉 ⊕mk−1,〈− jk 〉
))
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(d)
= u〈j/2〉 ⊕ u〈−j〉 ⊕
(
t−1⊕
k=1
(
u〈− kjk+1 〉 ⊕ u〈− (k+1)jk 〉
))
⊕
(
t−1⊕
k=2
(
mk−1,〈 jk+1 〉 ⊕mk−1,〈− jk 〉
))
(e)
= u〈j/2〉 ⊕ u〈−j〉 ⊕ uΣ ⊕ uj ⊕ u〈−j〉 ⊕
(
t−1⊕
k=2
(
mk−1,〈 jk+1 〉 ⊕mk−1,〈− jk 〉
))
= uΣ ⊕ uj ⊕ u〈j/2〉 ⊕
(
t−1⊕
k=2
(
mk−1,〈 jk+1 〉 ⊕mk−1,〈− jk 〉
))
where (a) follows from Construction 4; (b) and (c) follows from Construction 5; (d) follows from merging u〈−j/2〉 and u〈−2j〉
into the summation; and (e) follows from the fact that
⊕t−1
k=1
(
u〈− kjk+1 〉 + u〈− (k+1)jk 〉
)
= uΣ ⊕ uj ⊕ u〈−j〉, which we now
prove. Note that 〈 kk+1 〉 = 〈 k
′
k′+1 〉 implies 〈k〉 = 〈k′〉; 〈k+1k 〉 = 〈k
′+1
k′ 〉 implies 〈k〉 = 〈k′〉; 〈 kk+1 〉 = 〈k
′+1
k′ 〉 implies that〈k+ k′〉 = p− 1, and therefore it follows that in the summation, the 2(t− 1) = p− 3 summands are distinct. Denote by J the
set of the indexes of the summands, then J contains 1, 2, ..., p− 1 except two elements. Because 〈 kk+1 〉 6= 1 and 〈k+1k 〉 6= 1,
it follows that 〈−j〉 /∈ J . Because 〈 kk+1 〉 = 〈−1〉 and 〈k+1k 〉 = 〈−1〉 both imply that 〈k〉 = t, it follows that j /∈ J . Hence
J = [p− 1]\{j, 〈−j〉}, implying ⊕t−1k=1 (u〈− kjk+1 〉 ⊕ u〈− (k+1)jk 〉) = uΣ ⊕ uj ⊕ u〈−j〉. This completes the proof.
Theorem 7. Secure B is a (p− 1, p− 5, 2, 2) secure RAID scheme over Ft2, for any prime p and t = p−12 . In particular, the
density of the key rows of the generator matrix is 2p− 5, and the density of the message rows is 3.
Proof. We interpret the scheme using the method described in Section IV-A and apply Corollary 2 to prove the correctness of
the scheme. It is clear from the construction that we can regard C2 as the B code; ci,j , i ∈ [2, t−1], j ∈ [p−1] as the systematic
message entries; and c1,j , j ∈ [p− 1] as the systematic key entries. Note that although u is not stored in the uncoded form, it
can be decoded from the systematic key entries (see Algorithm 1). Finally, the encoding mapping of C1 is given by fixing m
to be 0 in Construction 5. Specifically, Consider encoding information bits u1, ..., up−1 using C1, and denote the codeword by
A = (ai,j). Then by Construction 5, a1,j = uj ⊕ u〈2·j〉 ⊕ u〈−j〉, ai,j = u〈(i+1)·j〉 ⊕ u〈−i·j〉, for i ∈ [2, t− 1], j ∈ [p− 1]. And
by Lemma 4, at,j = uΣ ⊕ uj ⊕ u〈j/2〉 for j ∈ [p− 1]. Consider encoding the same set of information bits u1, ..., up−1 using
the dual B code described in Construction 3, and denote the codeword by B = (bi,j). Then for i ∈ [2, t − 1], j ∈ [p − 1], it
follows that a1,j = b1,j ⊕ b2,j , ai,j = bi+1,j and at,j =
⊕t
l=2 bl,j . On the other hand, for i ∈ [3, t], j ∈ [p− 1], it follows that
b1,j =
⊕t
l=1 al,j , b2,j =
⊕t
l=2 al,j , and bi,j = ai−1,j . Therefore, C1 and the dual B code are equivalent, and have the same
minimum distance. By Theorem 6, C1 is MDS. By Corollary 2, it follows that Construction 5 is a (p− 1, p− 5, 2, 2) secure
RAID scheme.
We now analyze the density of G. We say a key ui or a message bit mi,j is checked by ca,b if in G the row corresponding
to ui or mi,j is 1 in the (at+b)-th entry (which corresponds to ca,b). By construction, ui is checked by ct,b for b = 1, ..., p−1,
b 6= i, 〈2i〉, and is checked by exactly one element of {ca,1, ..., ca,t−1} for a = 1, ..., p− 1, a 6= 〈2i〉. Therefore ui is checked
for exactly p− 2 + p− 3 = 2p− 5 times. A message bit mi,j is checked by ci+1,j , ct,〈(i+2)j〉 and ct,〈−(i+1)j〉. Therefore mi,j
is checked for exactly 3 times. This completes the proof.
By Theorem 2, a lower bound on the density of the key rows is p − 2 and a lower bound on the density of the message
rows is 3. Therefore for the message rows, the scheme achieves the lowest density. For the key rows, the scheme achieves the
lower bound within a factor of 2.
Algorithm 1 m = Dec(c); Systematic Decoding.
1: for i← 1 to t do . Decode keys from c1,j , j ∈ [p− 1]. Recall that t = p−12 .
2: x← c1,〈i/4〉 ⊕ c1,〈−i/4〉 . x = u〈i/2〉 + u〈−i/2〉
3: ui ← c1,〈i/2〉 ⊕ x
4: u−i ← c1,〈−i/2〉 ⊕ x
5: end for . All keys have been decoded.
6: for i← 2 to t− 1 and j ← 1 to p− 1 do
7: mi−1,j ← ci,j ⊕ u〈(i+1)·j〉 ⊕ u〈−i·j〉 . Cancel keys to obtain message bits.
8: end for
Algorithm 1 describes a systematic decoding algorithm for the scheme. In the case of erasures/error, the erasure/error
decoding algorithm of the B code [24] is invoked to correct the erasures, and then Algorithm 1 is invoked to decode the
secret message. Encoding the scheme according to Construction 5 requires a total number of 2p2 − 9p + 7 XORs, or on
average 4 + 6p−5 XORs per message bit. Systematic decoding the scheme according to Algorithm 1 requires a total number
of p2 − 92p + 72 XORs, or on average 2 + 3p−5 XORs per message bit. Encoding each message bit requires at least 4 + 2p−5
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XORs by Corollary 1, and decoding each message bit requires at least 2 XORs. Therefore the secure B scheme has almost
optimal encoding and systematic decoding complexities.
A. Optimal secure RAID scheme from B codes
The secure RAID schemes constructed above are almost optimal in terms of density and computational complexity. It this
subsection we describe construction of strictly optimal schemes from the B codes. Particularly, we are able to construct optimal
(p− 1, p− 5, 2, 2) secure RAID schemes over Ft2, where t = p−12 , for any prime p ranging from 7 to 53.
Definition 3. Let p be a prime, t = p−12 , and let σ : [t] → [t] be a permutation. We say σ is proper with respect to p if
σ(1) 6= t and that for every codeword C = (ci,j) of the dual B code, cσ(i),j is a codeword of the B code.
Construction 6. (Optimal Secure B) Let p be a prime, t = p−12 , and let σ : [t]→ [t] be a proper permutation with respect to
p. Let u1, ..., up−1 be uniformly distributed key bits. The codewords of optimal secure B forms a t × (p − 1) array. The first
t− 1 rows of the array are the systematic key and message symbols, computed as follows. Denote by C ′ = c′i,j the codeword
of the dual B code computed by encoding the uj’s as information symbols and denote i∗ = σ(1), then ci∗,j = c′1,j = uj ,
j ∈ [p − 1]; for i 6= i∗, i ∈ [t − 1], j ∈ [p − 1], ci,j = c′σ(i),j ⊕mi,j , where the mi,j’s are the message bits. The t-th row
consists of the redundant symbols, which are computed by encoding the B code regarding the first (t − 1)-rows of the array
as information symbols.
An example of the optimal secure B schemes is shown in Figure 1. The proper permutation (in cycle representation [6]) is
σ = (1)(2, 3). It would be helpful to compare Figure 1 to Figure 5 and Figure 6 to see the effect of σ.
Theorem 8. The encoding scheme in Construction 6 is a (p− 1, p− 5, 2, 2) secure RAID scheme over Ft2. In particular, the
key rows of the generator matrix have optimal density p− 2, and the message rows have optimal density 3.
Proof. Similar as before, we interpret the scheme using the method described in Section IV-A. It follows from the construction
that C1 is the dual B code for which the rows of the codeword array is permuted according to σ, and C1 is the B code. Since
both C1 and C2 are MDS, by Corollary 2 the scheme is a (p− 1, p− 5, 2, 2) secure RAID scheme.
By Construction 3, each key bit appears in exactly p − 2 of the ci,j’s, and by Construction 4, each message bit appears
in exactly 3 of the ci,j’s. Therefore each key row has density p − 2 and each message row has density 3, meeting the lower
bound in Theorem 2 and proving the theorem.
Encoding Construction 6 requires 4 + 2p−5 XORs to encode each message bit and achieves the lower bound of Corollary
1. Systematic decoding the scheme by first reading the keys and then canceling them from the systematic message symbols
requires 2 XORs to decode each message bit, again achieving the obvious lower bound. Therefore Construction 6 has optimal
encoding and systematic decoding complexity.
It remains to address that whether a proper permutation σ exists and how to construct it. We are not aware of a method to
construct proper permutations with respect to an arbitrary prime p. However, consider an arbitrary permutation σ, the following
result is useful in determining whether σ is proper.
Lemma 5. Let p be a prime, t = p−12 , and let σ : [t]→ [t] be a permutation such that σ(1) = i∗ 6= t. Consider five multisets
A1 = {〈σ
−1(i)
i+1 〉 : i ∈ [t − 1], i 6= i∗}, A2 = {〈 1−σ
−1(i)
i+1 〉 : i ∈ [t − 1], i 6= i∗}, A3 = {〈−σ
−1(i)
i 〉 : i ∈ [t − 1], i 6= i∗},
A4 = {〈σ
−1(i)−1
i 〉 : i ∈ [t− 1], i 6= i∗} and A5 = ∪4i=1Ai ∪ {〈 1i∗+1 〉, 〈− 1i∗ 〉}. Then σ is proper with respect to p if and only
if σ−1(t) and 〈1− σ−1(t)〉 are elements of A5 with odd multiplicity and all other elements of A5 have even multiplicity.
The lemma can be proved by verifying Definition 3 according to Construction 3 and 4. The details are omitted. With Lemma
5 we can easily check whether a given σ is proper or not. Therefore a proper σ with respect to a given p, if exists, can be
found by exhaustive search. Proper σ with respect to 7 ≤ p ≤ 53 are listed in Table I. While finding a proper σ with respect to
p significantly larger than 53 by exhaustive search is prohibitive, we believe that they exist with respect to an infinite sequence
of p.
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